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Trying to persuade lawyers that they need to keep up-
to-date with technology is far from new. In 1904, judges 
and lawyers were urged to make themselves aware of 
photography because ‘they might otherwise accept what 
appears to be pure untouched work as reliable which 
was all the time outrageously worked on’,1 and in 1959 
Winsor C. Moore noted that ‘hundreds of important cases 
involving disputed typewriting have been tried but there 
are still lawyers here and there who apparently have 
never heard of them and courthouses where a disputed 
typewriting has never been considered. Although written 
in 1929, the statement is undoubtedly still true today.’2
Yet there is abundant evidence that new forms of 
evidence were readily accepted into in legal proceedings, 
a striking example being the case of Boyne City, G. & A.R. 
Co. v. Anderson3 in an appeal before the Supreme Court 
of Michigan on 7 November 1906. Blair J explained the 
facts behind one of the grounds of appeal at paragraph 2 
(330-331):
A phonograph was permitted to be operated in 
presence of the jury to reproduce sounds claimed to 
have been made by the operation of trains in proximity 
to respondent’s hotel. With proper proofs, such as were 
fully given in this case, to justify the introduction of the 
instrument as a substantially accurate and trustworthy 
reproducer of the sounds actually made and testified 
to, we think its use legitimate. Communications 
conducted through the medium of the telephone are 
held to be admissible, at least in cases where there is 
testimony that the voice was recognized. 27 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 1091, and cases cited; Wigmore 
on Evidence, §§ 669, 2155. The ground for receiving 
the testimony of the phonograph would seem to be 
stronger, since in its case there is not only proof by 
the human witness of the making of the sounds to 
be reproduced, but a reproduction by the mechanical 
witness of the sounds themselves. Even if it should be 
held that it was error to permit the use of the machine, 
its mild reproduction of sounds could not have so 
seriously prejudiced petitioner as to require a reversal 
of the case upon that ground.
In this instance, the correspondent in the Albany Law 
Journal4 was very enthusiastic:
That the law is a progressive science, is again 
demonstrated in the introduction of the phonograph 
in court. The novel incident occurred during the trial of 
a damage suit against an elevated railroad company 
in the United States Court at Boston, the object of 
the introduction of the recording instrument being to 
demonstrate to the court the deafening noise made by 
the elevated cars. Of course, the introduction of this 
evidence was strenuously objected to by the counsel for 
the defendant, but it was allowed by the court, and, we 
think, quite properly.
Although the complexity of the recording in 1906 pales 
into insignificance in comparison to the intricacy of 
evidence in digital format, nevertheless lawyers had 
to become familiar with new forms of evidence. That it 
should have taken so long in respect of the forensic issues 
relating to typewriters is an appalling indictment on the 
legal profession. Unfortunately, legal professions across 
the globe are not responding to evidence in electronic 
format fast enough – to the detriment, it is respectfully 
suggested, of the lay clients.
This is especially poignant in the light of the underlying 
rationale of A Philosophy of Evidence Law Justice in 
the Search for Truth (Oxford University Press, 2008) by 
Professor Hock Lai Ho, in which he demonstrates that the 
finder of fact acts as a moral agent, and central to this is 
that the findings by a court must be justifiable, and meet 
the demands of rationality and ethics. In this text, Ho 
analyses the debate on the claim that the trial process 
seeks the truth, exploring the connection between 
truth and justice. When read in the light of the unique 
characteristics of digital evidence, the text, stimulating 
and interesting as it is, takes on an even more relevant 
role – a role that the author might not have contemplated. 
This is because the factors and subsequent analysis 
have an added poignancy when taking into account the 
complexity of digital evidence, the potential volumes of 
evidence, the difficulty of finding evidence, persuading 
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the judge to order additional searches, the ease by 
which digital evidence can be destroyed, the costs of 
such exercises and the lawyer’s lack of knowledge 
when dealing with this form of evidence. In this respect, 
the inadequacy of the procedure leading to trial may 
cause unfairness, and Ho takes the comments of Lord 
Wilberforce and Viscount Kilmuir, and those of Lord 
Devlin to task, where they equate justice with fair process 
(pp 64-65). Ho suggests that the parties may be rightly 
aggrieved if concerns of procedure and costs override the 
search for truth. Of increasing concern in modern cases is 
the cost of finding and submitting digital evidence – and 
in addition, the resistance, especially of banks, to submit 
proper evidence to support their assertions, in particular 
with respect to phantom withdrawals from ATMs and on-
line banking disputes. The consequences that inevitably 
flow from a decision means that it is linked to claims of 
morality, and a judgment cannot be supported where it is 
reached in a cavalier manner.
Finally, on 4 June 2010 an application was made that the 
journal be included in the Scopus database. The title was 
accepted on 7 May 2012. The comments of the reviewer 
were included in the response:
‘The lack of citations to papers published here is 
disturbing, but there is no disputation that the subject 
matter is of immense and increasing social, political 
and legal significance. To those who follow technology, 
even at some distance, these papers are fascinating 
and, at times, frightening. But now that super-
sophisticated IT technology is carried around in the hip 
pockets of teenagers around the world, it is safe to say 
that nearly everyone will be affected, sooner or later, 
by one or more of the issues discussed in this journal, 
and if inclusion in Scopus helps to spread the word and 
increase the world’s legal sophistication when it comes 
to IT matters, all very much to the good! Welcome to 
Scopus.’
The editor thanks all those that have helped make this 
journal a critical success.
